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Field Marshal Helmuth Carl Bernard Graf von Moltke (1800-1891), Chief of Staff of the Prussian General Staff from
1857 to 1871, and then of the Great General Staff (GGS) from 1871 to 1888, and architect of Germany's brilliant Wars
of Unification (1864-71), remains the historical figure most responsible for shaping modern German military
thought.[1] He not only established enduring paradigms for Prusso-German tactical, operational, and strategic thinking
during his lifetime, but also shaped many of the political attitudes within the officer corps, particularly in his later
years.[2] Numerous attempts at imitation, combined with the spate of hagiographic biographies that followed his death,
attest to the reverence that the elder Moltke enjoyed within the officer corps.[3] His nephew, General Helmuth von
Moltke (generally referred to as "the younger"), by way of contrast, exhibited indecisiveness and lack of resolve during
the critical battle of the Marne in 1914, and consequently has suffered only ignominy in the hands of history.[4] By the
end of his long career, the elder Moltke had significantly increased the capabilities, influence, and prestige of the GGS,
developing and refining the staff-ride system, demanding the highest standards of professionalism from GGS officers,
gaining "direct access" (Immediatvortrag) to the Kaiser in 1871, and obtaining direct control over the training program
at the War Academy in 1872. In fact, the Prussian army and its general staff system had become the envy of and
model for other armed forces both on the continent and beyond. Moltke's military philosophy and strategic approach
have survived to inspire successive generations of soldiers. This essay offers an introduction to the great Chief of
Staff's significance to the German military tradition.
Born in Mecklenburg in 1800, Moltke served initially in the Danish army, less by choice than through paternal
"persuasion," for his father had forced him into the Danish cadet corps. Moltke's quiet nature, gentle disposition, and
broad cultural interests had rather inclined him toward becoming a professor of history. In 1822, he enrolled in the
Prussian army primarily because it offered better opportunities for promotion. In 1826, Moltke received his first
assignment to the General Staff--to its topographical section--where his talents for detail and thoroughness became
evident. Between 1835 and 1839, he served as a military advisor in Turkey. Upon his return, he became well
acquainted with the Prussian royal family, serving first as an aide to Frederick III and eventually appointed Chief of
the General Staff by King, and later Emperor, William I, whom he had greatly impressed. While arguably Germany's
most important soldier, Moltke spent only a few years with troops and never commanded a unit before assuming
overall direction of the campaign against Austria at the age of 65.
Military Theories: Moltke and Clausewitz
Although he attended the Berlin War College (or General War School as it was then called) in 1823 while Clausewitz
was serving as its director--a purely administrative position which involved no teaching--the two had little, if any,
contact. Nonetheless, in an interview in 1890, Moltke reputedly listed Homer's works, the Bible, and On War among
the five books that most influenced him.[5] Indeed, many of Moltke's writings draw from or paraphrase the great
military philosopher.[6] Soldiers and historians of his day wrote that the renowned Chief of the GGS had simply put
the master's theories into action: "The intellectual development of our Moltke came to completion under the closest
connection with Clausewitz's posthumously published work, On War."[7] Sigismund von Schlichting, a devoted
disciple of Moltke, declared him the "best student" Clausewitz ever had.[8] The well-known military author and
biographer of Clausewitz, Rudolf von Caemmerer, described the great Chief of the GGS as the "most gifted pupil of
Clausewitz," and stated that reading the master had taught Moltke how, not what, to think.[9]

Like Clausewitz, Moltke emphasized flexibility in military planning and execution. He eschewed dogmatic thinking,
whether tactical or strategic, accepted chance and uncertainty as inseparable from the nature of war, and recognized the
often decisive (but incalculable) role that moral factors played in victory. He originally viewed the destruction of the
enemy's main fighting force as the proper aim of war, but gradually became less convinced of its genuine decisiveness
after the French resorted to partisan warfare in 1870-71.[10] "We want to believe," he later told the Reichstag, "that
neither the Thirty Years' nor the Seven Years' War will recur, but when millions of individuals are engaged in a bitter
struggle for national existence, we cannot expect that the matter will be decided with a few victorious battles."[11]
Although clearly influenced by On War, Moltke's military theories differed from Clausewitz's in one very significant
way. Moltke attempted to maintain separate spheres for politics and war, and believed that policy should not influence
military operations. "Policy," he wrote, "avails itself of war to attain its aims; it works decisively at the beginning and
end of war, [and has] the right to increase its demands or be satisfied with a lesser success," but "in its actions
[strategy] is fully independent of policy" for it needs a free hand to pursue that elusive quarry, tactical victory, the
attainment of which serves policy best.[12]
Moltke's rejection of Clausewitz reflects the struggle to retain control over the wherewithal that permits decisive
victory and brings about the realization of the perfect battle.[13] The dispute between Moltke and Bismarck after the
battle of Königgrätz on the third of July 1866 provides a classic example. Following the Prussian victory, Moltke
wanted to advance on Vienna and complete the annihilation of the Austrian forces. Bismarck, however, wanted to
avoid humiliating the Austrians, for he needed their support (or at least their neutrality) if war against France proved
necessary to complete the unification of Germany. Then, a few days after the Prussian victory, the French Emperor,
Napoleon III, offered to act as mediator in negotiations with Austria. Bismarck could not refuse such an offer from a
European sovereign without risking a war over the issue of honor. Indeed, Prussia had to proceed cautiously, for, as
Bismarck wrote to his wife on 9 July, "we don't live alone in Europe but with three other Powers who hate and envy
us."[14] Thus, the perfect tactical victory that Moltke desired in this instance would not have served policy.
On another level, however, this rejection of Clausewitz amounts to more than a struggle for autonomy. It subordinates
diplomacy to strategic thinking, thereby reversing Clausewitz's famous formulation that war is a continuation of policy
by other means. This perversion, which appears quite often in the military literature of Moltke's epigones, men like
Colmar von der Goltz and Friedrich von Bernhardi, owes much of its popularity to Moltke's powerful influence at the
turn of the century. Of course, such interpretations of Clausewitz do not belong solely to Moltke or to the Germans.
French, British, and US military writers have cast the master in a similar light throughout much of the 19th and 20th
centuries.[15] Indeed, Clausewitz's dictum regarding the subordination of military leadership to political authority
remains the hardest for soldiers--who witness firsthand the price of military failure--to accept.
Tactical victory formed the center of Moltke's vision of war. He saw strategy--a "free, practical, artistic activity"--as a
"system of expedients" designed to establish, as far as possible, the conditions for tactical success. Strategy must
remain flexible to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to react to unpredictable factors like "weather,
illnesses, railway accidents, misunderstandings, and disappointments."[16] Attempting to carry a war plan beyond the
opening engagement he considered the greatest of follies, for the first clash of arms brought only new opportunities
and necessities to attacker and defender alike. Nonetheless, staff officers should spare no effort in planning for as many
contingencies as possible. After 1871, Moltke himself never ceased planning military solutions to Germany's constant
strategic dilemma--a war on two fronts. He developed Germany's war plans inductively, changing them according to
the evolving military situation in France and Russia, focusing the main effort first on one front, then the other, and
back again as necessary.[17]
The last half of the 19th century saw revolutions in communication, transportation, and weapon technologies that
would fundamentally alter the conduct of war. Improvements in long-range, rapid-firing rifles and cannon afforded a
defending enemy decisive advantages in firepower, and threatened to make the successful execution of an infantry
attack, especially a frontal one, impossible.[18] As Moltke wrote in 1858, the universal and fundamental improvements
in infantry weapons alone necessitated "a change in the tactics of all branches. . . . The firepower of an infantry platoon
[today] surpasses the range and destructive effect of the case-shot of a six-pounder cannon."[19] His response to this
general "crisis" illustrates his creative genius--he advocated combining the advantages of flank attacks and the tactical
defensive, enticing the enemy to attack, waiting for the right moment to smash his assault with overwhelming

firepower, then finishing him off with an annihilating counterattack.[20] To be sure, this solution had obvious
limitations in that it required either an available flank for the assaulting force, or an enemy willing to attack first.
Nineteenth-century warfare lacked neither.
Political Attitudes
Moltke also set the political tone within the officer corps, particularly with his attitudes toward the liberal agenda of
the mid-19th century, and toward social democracy thereafter.[21] The famous man of literature and letters who, in the
1820s and 1830s, embraced cosmopolitan and romanticist views, had hardened into a cynical conservative after
witnessing the turmoil created by the failed Revolution of 1848.[22] Moltke feared that, like the French Revolution of
1789, the present one would follow the "old course, from monarchy to republic, from republic to dictatorship."[23] By
November 1848, however, even as he wrote to his brother that he saw "no choice other than reaction or anarchy,"
counter-revolutionary forces had already begun to restore order across much of Europe.[24] Two years later, Moltke
experienced the humiliating terms of the Punctation of Olmütz, in which Austria forced Prussia to abandon her early
plans to unify Germany.[25] Moltke called the agreement a "shameful peace" and considered it further evidence of the
bankruptcy of liberal values.[26]
While serving as a member of the Conservative Party in the Prussian Parliament (Landtag) and later in the Reichstag,
Moltke campaigned repeatedly against the Social Democrats' efforts to abolish the military as a separate and privileged
class and to reduce the standing army to a militia.[27] In his 1874 address to the Reichstag, he declared:
Wars conducted by militias have the characteristic of lasting much longer and for this reason costing much
more in terms of lives and money than all other wars. I remind you of the recent War of Secession in
America, which each side had to wage essentially with militias.[28]
To be sure, the Chief of the GGS did not need to inspire conservative attitudes within the officer corps; its mostly
aristocratic members were already predisposed to them. Rather, Moltke's speeches and writings articulated the officers'
general apprehensions regarding Germany's future political course, and set the agenda for the military's campaign to
preserve its hard-won status and prestige. In the face of newly emerging pacifist and materialistic attitudes, many
officers, in fact, took great delight in quoting Moltke's famous statement that "Eternal peace is a dream, and not even a
beautiful one; . . . war is an integral part of the divine order of things . . . the fate of humankind, the inevitable activity
of nations."[29]
Legacies
Moltke left positive and negative legacies to German military theory. First, the overwhelming success of his victories
against Denmark, Austria, and France encouraged the development of a self-stylized, uniquely German approach to
war in the last third of the 19th century. In 1873, for example, the Prussian military periodical Military-Weekly
published an anonymous essay entitled, "On Military Education and Science," which examined the intellectual and
educational climate responsible for the "great successes of German arms."[30] It described the German approach to
war as soundly pragmatic and free of abstract, doctrinaire thinking:
The abstract view [of war which Clausewitz] derided now stands discredited in many ways. . . . [A] single
conceptual system spanning all time is impossible . . . . The overwhelming successes of the wars of 1866
and 1870-71 encourage this view--that strict discipline, good weapons, effective elementary tactics, good
marching orders, railways, practical supply measures, and telegraphs decide everything in war.[31]
By the early 1880s, this free-form approach to war had further established itself as part of the German military
tradition, accruing still more Moltkean ideas: simplicity is the essential ingredient of an order; war plans do not endure
beyond the first engagement; friction, chance, and uncertainty are inescapable elements of war; and strategy serves
policy best when it strives for the highest aim, complete tactical victory.[32] The fact that military writers often accused
each other of Schematismus--rigid, prescriptive thinking--in Germany's turn-of-the-century military debates indicates
that Moltke's ideas had become paradigmatic within the officer corps. Ironically, an inherent contradiction developed
in the German view of war at this time--namely, that while war possessed no absolute rules, the destruction of the
enemy's forces had to remain its ultimate aim.[33]

Second, Moltke's open, inductive approach to war also helped legitimize a decentralized style of warfighting called
(perhaps wrongly) Auftragstaktik. Much confusion reigns concerning this concept and its "dubious" historical
validity.[34] Military writers on either side of the Atlantic have somewhat abused the term Auftragstaktik in an effort
to legitimize their own preferred style of command.[35] In fact, Auftragstaktik and the meaning behind it surfaced
decisively, albeit sparingly, in the debate over tactics that raged for years between the Imperial Army's traditionalists
and reformists. In its origins, the concept probably owes more to that leading figure of the Prussian Restoration,
Gerhard von Scharnhorst, than to Moltke.[36] But Moltke clearly advocated the decentralization of military effort. He
reasoned that war, a product of opposing wills subject to a host of frictions, gives rise to rapidly changing situations
that quickly render a commander's decisions obsolete. Hence, subordinates had to think and act according to the
situation, even without or in defiance of orders.[37] While Moltke did indeed promote such a style of command, he
did not condone willful disobedience. In fact, the Prussian, and later the German, army maintained strict codes of
discipline.
On the negative side, Moltke's near-perfect victories at Sadowa (1866) and Sedan (1870), combined with his efforts to
avoid the greater accuracy of infantry weapons, actually contributed more to the establishment of the so-called dogma
of the "battle of annihilation" and the cult of the flank attack than did Schlieffen's writings. Schlieffen believed that the
essence of military history lay in the flank attack, and saw no contradiction between hammering home his message in
the pages of the GGS's Quarterly and the apparent German tradition of attempting to remain free of doctrinaire
thinking.[38] In addition, military genius--shorn of Clausewitz's emphasis on the harmonic balance between qualities
of character and intellect--became associated with the ability to execute the perfect battle; indeed, it sometimes served
as an underlying, if tacit, justification for the exclusion of political influence from the conduct of war.[39]
In sum, Moltke's 70-year military career indelibly enhanced and legitimized a long martial tradition and shaped an
entire way of military thinking. He conducted near-perfect battles at a time when military technology severely
challenged traditional procedures and preferred notions. He remained committed to decentralized execution, a creative
approach to tactics, an inductive method of strategy, meticulous and continuous war planning, and the ideal of personal
and total dedication to duty, perhaps to a fault. Finally, to modern military theory, he contributed merely a few simple
principles centered on the principle of simplicity itself.
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